Greetings!

This blog is established to explore possibilities for disarmament as a means of enhancing common security in Europe. This would encompass both conventional and nuclear forces of all European states and those of the United States and Canada based in Europe.  It should occur in a manner that is balanced, transparent, irreversible, and provides undiminished security for all during every stage.

We invite participation in this discussion through postings of short articles, comments, and links to other websites.

Modernizing NATO’s Nuclear Forces

Hans M. Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists writes: “NATO’s nuclear posture is scheduled to undergo a significant modernization over the next decade that involves upgrading both the nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. The modernization will significantly increase the military capabilities of NATO’s nuclear posture in Europe. The modernization plan contradicts key elements of the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR).

 “First, the plan to increase the nuclear capabilities contradicts the main conclusion of the DDPR, that ‘the Alliance’s nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense posture’ (emphasis added). If the current posture meets the requirements of NATO, why then is it necessary to improve the capabilities? A modernized posture with increased capabilities would appear to exceed the deterrence and defense criteria determined by the DDPR.

 ”Second, increasing the capabilities of NATO’s nuclear posture in Europe is unlikely to help persuade Russia reduce its non-strategic nuclear forces or ‘create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons,’ two of the main arms control goals in the DDPR. Instead, since NATO’s strategy is to seek “reciprocal steps” from Russia, modernizing NATO’s nuclear posture would seem to endorse reciprocal Russian modernization of its non-strategic nuclear forces. It is hard to see why that would be in NATO’s interest.”

Read more.

 

Russia Seeks Nonstrategic Talks with US

According to the Global Security Newswire, ITAR-Tass reported  that on November 8 Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said his country wants to join the United States in discussions on short-range atomic armaments,.

“Dismantling the infrastructure of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and deploying them in the U.S. is the condition for efficiency. These aspects should be discussed within the multilateral format in full compliance by Washington with the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty,” he stated.

Read more.

A Personal Note

As coordinator of this blog, I have been on a sabbatical from this endeavor for the last six months as my wife and I downsized our possessions, sold our house, moved into a retirement community, and got acclimated there.    In May NATO had a summit meeting in Chicago that made little change in the Alliance nuclear policy.  Russia and the United States held presidential elections, which in effect put on hold any progress toward European disarmament.

 During this period I didn’t making any postings of significant articles and reports related to European disarmament.  Now I am making a fresh start.  I invite others to post their entries and make comments on the entries of others.

New Report on NATO’s Nuclear Options

On the issue of sharing of nuclear weapons within NATO, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has issued a report entitled “Looking Beyond the Chicago Summit: Nuclear Weapons in Europe and the Future of NATO”.  The authors are George Perkovich, Malcolm Chalmers, Steven Pifer, Paul Schulte and Jaclyn Tandler.

 Go to full report.

 

Making Progress on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons

Des Browne, former United Kingdom Defense Secretary, in a speech on “A Mistrustful NATO-Russian Relationship” at the Russian Council on International Affairs in Moscow on March 23, 2012, made the following points about non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.

In my view, the current U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe are militarily useless and should be reduced in number, consolidated to fewer bases, and eventually removed altogether. Not everyone in NATO agrees with me and it is not clear what the future of these weapons will be.

I know the Russian position up to now has been that these weapons must be removed to national territory before any discussion of Russian weapons in this category can begin. I say to this audience in all honesty that Russia is strong in this category of weapons systems and is known to station some of them very close to NATO territory, especially in the Baltic region. The nearest NATO non-strategic nuclear weapons to Russian territory are, on the other hand, at In cirlik airbase in Turkey, some 800 km away.

Now, I know that for Russia there is nothing non-strategic about these NATO weapons. I also believe, in its own security interests, Russia should be willing to negotiate their removal from Europe in return for a small reduction in its own stockpile, increased transparency on total numbers and locations of weapons held in this category, and some removal of Russian systems to points further away from NATO borders.

 There will be no hope of progress without reciprocity.

Non-strategic nuclear weapons are in my view a dangerous terrorism risk and should be eliminated altogether but even if people believe they provide a valuable source of security I think there is a worthwhile deal to be done here. Russia, in my view, would also be well within its rights to trade increased transparency on NSNW for greater transparency and increased warning time in relation to NATO conventional forces.

Read more of his address.

Open secret: NATO tactical nukes

 Francesco Calogero and Giorgio La Malfa from Italy, writing inThe Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, indicate:

• With the end of the Cold War, the military justification for tactical weapons in Europe has disappeared — as has the need for a neither-confirm-nor-deny secrecy policy on the details of these weapons.
• Presumably, if the United States were to remove its tactical weapons from Europe, Russia would move in the same direction. But, today, some NATO host countries of US tactical nuclear weapons are eager to see their withdrawal, while others are emphatic that they stay both for security and symbolic purposes.
• If NATO were to state in the upcoming Defense and Deterrence Posture Review the exact numbers and locations of its tactical nuclear weapons, a more open, frank, and democratic discussion would unfold on the relevance of these deployments. It would also be a gesture of sincerity toward NATO’s nonproliferation goals.

Read more.

Germany pushes for changes in NATO’s nuclear posture

Oliver Meier, writing in the blog of the Arms Control Association, indicates: “As NATO works to revise its nuclear and deterrence strategy in time for its May 2012 Summit in Chicago, Germany is pushing for changes in the Alliance’s declaratory policy and for a stronger role of NATO in arms control and disarmament. Yet at the same time, Berlin is trying to dodge a debate about the deployment of new types of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.”

Read more.