European Disarmament

Better off without Trident

Howard W. Hallman — Thu, 23 Feb 2012 22:50:54 +0000

From the United Kingdom we learn: “The Baptist Union of Great Britain, the Methodist Church, and United Reformed Church have been outspoken in their opposition to a replacement of the Trident nuclear submarines. Renewal of Trident is incompatible with the UK’s desire to encourage global nuclear non-proliferation.

“Trident is likely to cost the UK a staggering 3.7 billion per year over the next 15 years. In addition to moral and ethical concerns, there are also serious economic arguments against renewing it. Trident is a large drain on our budget with very little to show for it. Consequently we would all be better off without Trident.”

Removing U.S. and Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons from European Combat Bases

Howard W. Hallman — Mon, 06 Feb 2012 21:35:37 +0000

Recommendations of Global Zero NATO-Russian Commission Report

“Following on the New START treaty recently brought into force, Global Zero calls for the United States and Russia to begin comprehensive nuclear arms negotiations in early 2013 to reduce their arsenals to as low as 1,000 total weapons each, and, as part of these negotiations, to pursue the expedited removal of all of their tactical nuclear weapons from combat bases on the European continent to national storage facilities in the United States and Russia.

“These comprehensive negotiations would, for the first time in history, include all nonstrategic nuclear weapons (commonly referred to as tactical or sub-strategic nuclear weapons) and all non-deployed strategic weapons (‘reserve’ strategic vehicles and warheads in storage) in addition to the deployed strategic warheads and delivery vehicles that are constrained by New START.”

POGO Asks Panetta to Stop Funding B61 Nuclear Bombs in Europe

Howard W. Hallman — Sat, 04 Feb 2012 16:47:06 +0000

Dana Liebelson of the Project on Goverment Oversight (POGO) on February 2, 2012 reported: “When Defense Secretary Leon Panetta unveiled his plan to achieve $487 billion in budget cuts over the next ten years, he hinted that a smart strategy would mean cutting the number of nuclear weapons. Today, POGO sent him a very timely letter: the U.S. should cease funding the B61 nuclear bombs stationed in Europe, or pass the costs on to the countries where they’re stationed. This would save taxpayers more than $2 billion dollars.

NATO allies grapple with shrinking defense budgets

Howard W. Hallman — Wed, 01 Feb 2012 21:57:32 +0000

Craig Whitlock writing in the January 30, 2012 Washington Post indicates: “NATO allies are confronting a sustained weakening of the military alliance as ailing economies are forcing nearly all members, including the United States, to accelerate cuts to their defense budgets at the same time.

“The Pentagon’s recent decision to eliminate two of the Army’s four brigages in Europe is the latest blow to NATO’s military capabilities. It extends a year of grim announcements from members of the alliance that they can no longer afford their security commitments and that a long period of austerity is in the offing.”

2 Army brigades to leave Europe in cost-cutting move

Howard W. Hallman — Wed, 18 Jan 2012 16:28:39 +0000

Greg Jaffe in an article in the January 13, 2012 Washington Post writes: “The Obama administration has decided to remove two of the four U.S. Army brigades remaining in Europe as part of a broader effort to cut $487 billion from the Pentagon’s budget over the next decade, said senior U.S. officials.

“The reductions in Army forces, which have not been formally announced, are likely to concern European officials, who worry that the smaller American presence reflects a waning of interest in the decades-long U.S.-NATO partnership in Europe.”

Rose Gottemoeller Discusses Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons and Conventional Forces in Europe

Howard W. Hallman — Fri, 06 Jan 2012 15:58:04 +0000

In an interview with Maria Tabek of Ria Novosti on December 23, 2011, Rose Gottemoeller, assistant secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, U.S. State Department, among other topics discussed non-strategic nuclear weapons and conventional armed forces in Europe.

Here are excerpts from the interview on these topics.

QUESTION: New START Treaty implementation is going pretty well but US representatives used to say that New START is just a first step. The U.S. wanted to discuss with Russia further reductions not only of strategic nuclear weapons but also of non-strategic. Have you already started these discussions and if so at which stage are they at now?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: You asked me about tactical nuclear weapons as we say or non-strategic nuclear weapons. President Obama the day he signed the New START Treaty on April 8th of 2010 said that we should be looking for the next nuclear reduction negotiation and began to plan for it. He mentioned three categories actually for future reduction negotiations. The first category would be further reductions in deployed nuclear warheads. These warheads are the easiest ones to see from outer space, from either Russian satellites or US satellites. Up to this point in the history of arms control efforts we’ve always focused on deployed weapons.

The President proposed two new categories. One – non-deployed nuclear weapons, weapons that are in storage facilities or reserve and the third category is non-strategic weapons or tactical nuclear weapons. Those last two categories are brand new and for that reason we have been very interested in working with Russian Federation on some new approaches that will be necessary for verifying such agreements. We are also interested in some of the conceptual and definition questions that are involved because what we consider a tactical nuclear weapon may be different from what the Russian Federation considers to be a tactical nuclear weapon or non-strategic nuclear weapon.

At the moment we are engaged in what I would say is a “homework period”. We are preparing a way for new negotiations but we are not yet ready to embark on new negotiations.

QUESTION: What is the problem? Why can’t you start new negotiations?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: It’s not really a problem. As I said I consider it’s highly necessary to do this preparatory work. We really have to figure out how to scope new negotiations and I’m emphasizing that we are ready for serious discussions but we are not ready yet for reduction negotiations. We really have to figure out the new conceptual structure.

QUESTION: How long do you think this “homework period” will last?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Oh I can’t predict entirely because we have some work to do, there is another factor that I should mention. That is the fact that the US is engaged in a so-called deterrence and defense posture review with our allies in NATO, and that affects defense in Europe whether conventional or nuclear. So before that review is completed we wouldn’t be ready in any event because we have to understand how our allies think about nuclear weapons in Europe. So that will be completed towards the time of the NATO Summit in Chicago in May. And furthermore, here in the United States, we are pursuing an analysis under the umbrella of the 2010 nuclear posture review to look at the future of our strategic nuclear forces. And that is in terms of force posture and in terms of nuclear doctrine. It’s very important to complete that review as well. This review should be completed pretty soon. These are other factors that are not related to US-Russian discussion, that are related to NATO deterrence and defense posture review and to our internal US review.

QUESTION: Another deadlock in bilateral relations: conventional armed forces in Europe? What are the chances of Russia and US to find some common grounds in this area?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Conventional arms control in Europe is again not simply a bilateral matter it’s not just a matter between Moscow and Washington. It’s multilateral that involves NATO countries who are our allies and also involves other countries who are not members of any alliance, it involves countries like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, the South Caucasus, Armenia and Georgia, Moldova, I was just there last week in Moldova – and also Ukraine, Belarus – so there are many countries that have an interest in this matter. And I really see it as a complex series of discussions, but nonetheless, while I was in Europe last week I could see the great deal of enthusiasm for moving forward in modernizing conventional arms control. I think about the exciting possibilities for 2012, I think this is an area with some very exciting possibilities for this.

The interview also included discussion of missile defense in Europe. Read more in the complete interview.

Mutually Assured Stability

Howard W. Hallman — Wed, 21 Dec 2011 21:04:02 +0000

Simon Saradzhyan, a research fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, writing about tactical nuclear weapons in The Moscow Times (December 20, 2011), indicates: “Given the scarcity of benefits and abundance of costs of these arsenals, Moscow should join Washington in negotiating measures to bring tactical nukes into the realm of bilateral arms control. The two powers can start with defining the weapons and exchanging information on their past reductions and current stockpiles. They could then negotiate the verifiable reduction of their stockpiles and their consolidation in one or two of the best-guarded facilities.”

He concludes: “It is time that Russia and United States move away from deterrence based on a 20th-century concept of mutually assured destruction. Instead, they should move toward what experts on both sides have referred to as mutually assured stability. Consolidation and reduction of tactical nuclear weapons will facilitate this transition, advancing both countries’ common vital interests in preventing the use of nuclear weapons. These measures will also allow Moscow to allocate more funds to building conventional forces capable of countering more imminent threats to Russia’s security, such as a low-intensity insurgency or local conflicts, without risking a nuclear Armageddon.”

Unfinished Business on Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Howard W. Hallman — Wed, 14 Dec 2011 20:52:46 +0000

Frank Klotz, Susan Kuch, and Franklin Miller, writing in a December 14, 2011 New York Times op-ed article, recall how in 1991 U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in a reciprocal Presidential Nuclear Initiative led the way to taking thousands of tactical nuclear weapons out of service and in some cases eliminating them all together. This was accomplished on the basis of unilateral, parallel actions without an arms control treaty.

The authors believe that it is time to take up unfinished business of reducing tactical nuclear weapons. They indicate: “The next logical step would be for both countries to disclose, on a reciprocal basis, the location, types and numbers of tactical nuclear weapons that remain.

“This should pose few problems for the United States and its allies; well-informed accounts of deployed American weapons have been around for years. But disclosing such data might prove difficult for Russia, given its penchant for secrecy and the political risks of confirming it does indeed possess a far greater number of these weapons.

“If such difficulties can be overcome, these two steps would enhance transparency and mutual confidence. In the process, they could help pave the way to future negotiations on reducing both tactical and nondeployed nuclear weapons.”

Salvaging the CFE Treaty: Options for Washington

Howard W. Hallman — Fri, 09 Dec 2011 21:18:27 +0000

In a March 2010 paper from the Brookings Institution, Anne Witkowsky, Sherman Garnett, and Jeff McCausland offer ideas that remain relevant even as the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is more-or-less in suspension. Entitled Salvaging the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty Regime: Options for Washington, this 39-page paper presents four options.

1) Continue the current policy course of seeking parallel actions by NATO members and Russia to resume Russian CFE implementation and move toward the Adapted CFE Treaty, with some additional inducements to Moscow.

2) Continue the current policy course while opening the Adapted CFE Treaty to amendment.

3) Initiate provisional application of Adapted CFE Treaty, but with conditions.

4) Decline to continue implementing the CFE Treaty and manage a “soft landing” for the end of the CFE regime.

See full paper.

The Future of NATO’s Nuclear Weapons: A German Perspective

Howard W. Hallman — Tue, 06 Dec 2011 22:00:32 +0000

Ambassador Rolf Nikel, Federal Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control at the German Federal Foreign Office, explains Germany’s approach to questions surrounding tactical nuclear weapons based in Europe in light of NATO’s Strategic Concept and Deterrence and Defense Posture reviews. His views appear in Nuclear Policy Paper No. 9 in a series put together by the Arms Control Association, BASIC, and the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.

Read more.